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   I think Professor Berton wanted me to discuss his paper because he used the Japanese 
words amae and tatemae in characterizing the psychological aspect of Japanese diplomacy. 
They are the words of everyday use, not easily translatable into English and quite handy in 
describing Japanese behavior. This does not mean, however, that the characteristics of 
Japanese behavior cannnot be described in English. Only the use of those words makes the 
Japanese characteristics more visible, just as the use of English words, like freedom or fair 
play or foul play for that matter, makes the characteristics of American politics stand out more 
sharply. 
   I have, therefore, no quarrel with Professor Berton in his characterization of Japanese 
politics or diplomacy in terms of amae and tatemae. There are places, however, where I should 
like to elaborate on his statements. For instance, he says, "It seems to me that in discussing 
amae relationships, we have to consider the power relationship between individuals, groups, or 
nations." I understand why he feels it necessary to consider the power relationship with regard 
to amae. But I should say that the viewpoint of power might obscure the subtlety of the nature 
of amae. Because amae is by definition a function of dependency need. And the fact that we 
have a rich vocabulary relating to amae means that such a need is accessible and acceptable to 
Japanese people. Thus the relationship that involves amae is unbalanced not necessarily in 
terms of power, but in terms of amae need or rather its awareness. Of course in many cases the 
one who is at the receiving end of amae is inferior in power or helpless compared to the other 
who gives. However, it can happen that the ostensibly powerful side harbors a secret desire of 
amae while vigorously repressing it. In other words, one has to keep in mind that amae 
relationships and power relationships do not always run in parallel. 
   Now this reasoning, it seems to me, goes straight to the heart of the matter, if you want to 
consider the vicissitudes of the Japanese-American relations for the past decades. The golden 
days of amae for Japan were in the first decade after the end of the Pacific War. Japan, a 
defeated nation, was at the mercy of U. S., a former enemy turned liberator. No doubt Japan 
indulged in American generosity, a case of pure amae so to speak which set the pattern for 
their relationship to this day. In the meantime, the power relationship between the two 
countries has been shifting and that is why we now have a serious trade friction between us. 
No doubt the amae psychology of Japanese people contributed a great deal to the development 
of the conflict, as Professor Berton makes it out quoting from Kitamura Hiroshi's monograph.
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But I should like to go further than simply attributing the conflict to unfulfilled amae. For that 
purpose let me borrow the term Nicolson's Dilemma, which I have learned from Professor 
Zartman's presentation at this conference, "Development of the Concepts of Negotiation and 
Mediation and their Mechanism in the Contemporary International Community." 
   Accoding to Professor Zartman, Nicolson's Dilemma concerns a situation when a 
Shopkeeper meets a Warrior. The Shopkeeper cannot negotiate with the Warrior except in the 
Warrior's terms, but if he wants to fight off the Warrior, he himself has to become a Warrior 
and that is his dilemma. I think this fits in perfectly with Japan's self-image vis-a-vis U. S. 
But the trouble is that U. S. also has a comparable self-image vis-a-vis Japan, inasmuch as 
they feel that Japan is impinging on American vital interests. It's a pity, however, that they 
cannot behave like a gentle shopkeeper. They behave like a self-righteous warrior. No wonder 
that U. S. and Japan cannot resolve their conflict. I believe that if Japan is awakened to her 
potentiality as a warrior and the U. S. in turn becomes more accepting and admitting of her 
own plight, they may realize that they are really on equal grounds. Only then they will learn 
to compromise with each other. 
   I would like to tell you a little anecdotal episode which I read in the newspaper that 
covered the most recent negotiation between U. S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor and 
Japan's Minister of International Trade and Industry Ryutaro Hashimoto. This illustrates very 
well the poin I have made above. Hashimoto told Kantor during the meeting that he couldn't 
accept the tactic of brandishing Super 301, that it was like a threat at gun-point. To which 
Kantor replied that the gun was directed at himself also, meaning that he will he severely 
criticized if he fails to gain a favorable outcome. Apparently this reply was sufficient to 
silence Hashimoto then and there. He would not and could not pursue Kantor further along 
this line, since he instinctively identified with `helpless' Kantor. I don't know if Kantor made 
this reply with the knowledge of Japanese psychology. Whether he did or not, it was a clever 
remark if he meant to elicit a sympathetic response from the Japanese side. Suppose 
Hashimoto was skilled in confrontation, he could have made the following response to 
Kantor's remark. "You mean you have to hurt us in order to save your own skin? That's not 
fair." To this Kantor of course would have made a rebuttal, saying: "Don't say that you are 
going to be hurt. It is we who are hurt by your trade policy." Hashimoto then could have 
wound up the verbal exchange by saying: "So you have to hurt us because you think we hurt 
you? Look! We are not engaged in war, are we? Let's call it quits. Let's get down to the 
business of talking over our differences and see what we can, I mean without Super 301." I 
think you can see that I played with imaginative dialogue in order to reassure myself that our 
Japanese delegation will eventually learn to overcome Nicolson's Dilemma. 
    Finally, I shall make one short comment on Professor Berton's statement with regard to 
tatemae. He states that tatemae concerns only the in-group and does not extend to out-groups. 
That is certainly true, because tatemae is by definition a token of agreement of the members of 
a group. So Professor Berton is quite right. But let me say that this logic of tatemae also 
explains why Japanese politicians or diplomats have the reputation of being poor negotiators. 
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They are much too eager to reach an agreement. They feel that once they reach an agreement, 
they have a room to move about within that framework which constitutes tatemae. In other 
words, tatemae is a token satisfaction of amae and that is why it is not conducive to ironing out 
fundumental differences of interest.
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